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1 Introduction
Even though global foreign direct investment has faced two major negative
shocks since the turn of the century, the stock of foreign capital in most
countries is much higher than several decades ago. Some authors argue that
the influence of lobbying on the political process has grown due to this aspect
of globalization. This perception sometimes culminates in the notion of the
’loss of sovereignty’ of the nation state. According to this view, national gov-
ernments lose their discretion to set policy, e.g. environmental regulation,
because multinational enterprises have a better lobbying position vis-a`-vis
governments than national firms: the former can relocate in response to un-
wanted policies, and governments that want to avoid such relocation must
succumb to the wishes of the multinationals. In this fashion, a race to the
bottom ensues when multinational firms are important, leading to ’pollu-
tion havens’ with excessively lax regulation to attract multinational firms.
Contrasting this view is the ’not-in-my-backyard’ (NIMBY) story: If pollu-
tion causes high damages, governments may set inefficiently high pollution
standards to deter polluting multinationals.
Such motivated, we ask whether the growing importance of multinational
firms indeed leads to harmful policy biases and, in particular, whether it leads
to lax pollution regulation. We focus on a small country that has to take
environmental regulation in the rest of the world as given. Our framework
applies to the interaction of industrialized countries with transition economies
and LDCs, or to cases where some industrialized countries decide to introduce
stricter environmental regulation than others due to national preferences.1
We analyze how such countries set their regulation when they face a
footloose (“multinational”) monopolist that can choose where to set up its
production facilities. The monopolist can engage in lobbying activities to
influence regulation. To bring out the role of a footloose firm’s ability to
freely choose locations, we compare the outcome with the one that would
emerge with a “national” monopolist that is restricted to produce in its
home country. While there is no general result that multinational firms are
regulated more or less heavily than national firms, we can determine the
circumstances under which each case emerges.
1For instance, in contrast to European countries and Australia, the United States never
ratified the Kyoto Protocol and Canada recently withdrew from it for fears of unemploy-
ment and negative economic effects. Also, countries follow divergent national regulatory
approaches towards the use of nuclear energy. Regulation in France is rather lax and
allows for exports to third countries, whereas Germany’s approach has traditionally been
stricter, culminating in the recent decision to phase out nuclear energy production.
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More specifically, we consider a stylized three-stage game.2 In period 1,
the small-country regulator who maximizes political support chooses the level
of a pollution standard that raises unit costs. In period 2, the monopolist
chooses between three options: produce exclusively from the home country
(“no relocation”), open a plant in the foreign country as well (“partial relo-
cation”); close down production in the small country altogether (“complete
relocation”). In period 3, the monopolist chooses quantities on the two mar-
kets. International trade is allowed, but subject to trade or transportation
costs.
We determine all equilibria of the game. Our central results (Propositions
1 and 2) provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium regulation
and the resulting location patterns for the multinational firm as a function of
the main parameters (environmental damage, transportation costs and the
weight of the firm in the political support function). If the firm weight in-
creases and potential environmental damages decrease, regulation changes in
such a way that the equilibrium moves from relocation to partial relocation
and finally to no relocation. For very low transportation costs, regulation in-
duces complete relocation (with imports from the foreign country), whereas,
for high transportation costs, it induces only partial relocation (where both
markets are served locally).
We use the equilibrium characterization to illustrate how the regulation
of multinational and national firms differs, and how lobbying affects the dif-
ference. As a first benchmark case, we follow the related literature (see
Markusen et al. 1995; Rauscher 1995) and assume that the regulator applies
a consumer standard. Thus she cares only about consumer surplus and envi-
ronmental damage, not about producer surplus – in particular, her behavior
is not affected by lobbying.
In this benchmark case, whether the national or multinational firm pro-
duces and pollutes more in the home country depends on transportation
costs and the environmental damage parameter. For sufficiently low trans-
portation costs, the output of the national firm is never lower than the home
country output of the multinational firm, and for wide parameter ranges the
output of the national firm is higher. For high transportation costs, the pic-
ture is reversed when environmental damages are at intermediate levels: The
multinational firm produces and pollutes more in the small country than the
national firm.3 Nevertheless, in the benchmark case without firm influence
2The underlying location game is related to Motta and Thisse (1994) and Markusen et
al. (1993, 1995); see Section 2 for more details.
3Essentially, imposing strict regulation has greater environmental benefits with a na-
tional firm than with a multinational firm. For high transportation costs, the multinational
firm does not export to the foreign country, so that regulation only affects pollution re-
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consumers are always better off with multinational firms than with national
firms: Welfare, defined as consumer surplus minus environmental damages is
always higher.
With a positive weight of producer surplus in the regulator’s objective
function, this no longer is true. It is straightforward that lobbying leads to
weaker regulation with national as well as multinational firms. More surpris-
ingly, there are two striking results. First, the parameter region where the
multinational produces higher output and pollution corresponds to higher
values of the equilibrium damage parameters, that is, to more damaging
pollution. Second, for more dangerous pollutants and sufficiently high trans-
portation costs, welfare can be lower with a multinational firm than with a
national firm when the profit weight is sufficiently high.
In the main text, we analyze a monopoly model with specific functional
forms for demand, costs, environmental damage and the type of regulation.
In the appendix, we then derive the most important insights of the specific
model in a more general set-up. It turns out that neither the specific func-
tional forms nor the assumption of monopoly markets are necessary for the
main results.
After a discussion of related literature in Section 2, Section 3 describes the
model. Section 4 derives the locational choices of firms for given regulation
levels. In Section 5, we characterize regulation for national and multinational
firms, respectively. Section 6 compares regulation levels in the two cases, and
it shows how lobbying affects the comparison. Section 7 deals with welfare
issues. In Section 8, we discuss the robustness of our results, in particular,
by reference to a more general model analyzed in the appendix. Section 9
concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper combines two strands of literature.
First, it belongs to the vast literature on lobbying. Hillman (1989) and
Grossman and Helpman (2002) provide surveys of different lobbying ap-
proaches and how they are interrelated.4 In our model, the regulator maxi-
mizes a weighted average of consumer and producer surplus. In this respect,
the paper builds from the political support function approach (Peltzman
1976).5
sulting from production for the home country. For the national firm, however, regulation
also curbs pollution resulting from exports to the foreign country.
4Potters and Sloof (1996) provide a survey with an empirical focus.
5As shown for instance by Grossman and Helpman (1994) such a regulatory behavior
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Within the lobbying literature, our paper is most closely related to several
papers that deal specifically with lobbying activities of multinational firms.6
Lobbying of multinational firms has mostly been analyzed in the context
of endogenous trade policy, under the assumption that the location choices
of firms are exogenous. For instance, Hillman and Ursprung (1993) analyze
trade protection in a model with a given number of firms, an exogenous share
of which are multinational. If the share of multinationals increases, protec-
tion declines. This effect reflects a change of lobbying incentives of national
firms. With increasing competition from multinationals, domestic producers
benefit less from trade protection, which reduces their incentives to lobby for
it.7 Another strand of literature focuses on the effect of lobbying by domes-
tic producers if multinationals may circumvent trade barriers. For instance,
Grossman and Helpman (1996) analyze domestic lobbying for protection if
multinational firms anticipate the political lobbying outcome and decide to
export to the foreign country or invest to circumvent trade protection. In
their model, multinationals do not lobby, and the decision to invest abroad
results from a tariff-jumping motive.8 Empirical studies indicate that for-
eign and multinational firms influence the political process. Even though the
extent of lobbying tends to be smaller for multinational than for domestic
firms, the former have a significant effect on domestic politics (see Gawande
et al., 2006; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000).9
can result from a lobbying game in which interest groups offer contribution payments to
an incumbent government. The government deviates from the welfare maximizing policy
in exchange for contributions.
6We restrict the small overview to literature which analyzes lobbying in the context of
multinational firms. Another strand of the literature analyzes lobbying against environ-
mental regulation. For instance, Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2008) analyze how lobbying
influences investments in abatement technology. In the context of trade theory, Schleich
(1999) analyzes the interaction between lobbying against environmental regulation and
lobbying for trade protection. In his model, the market structure is exogenous and plant
relocation does not occur as a consequence of strict regulation. Sturm (2003) provides a
survey of the literature.
7Recent contributions on lobbying of multinationals are Stoyanov (2009), Gawande et
al. (2006) and Konishi et al. (1999). Aidt and Albornoz (2011) analyze lobbying efforts
of multinationals directed at protecting investments against taxes or other expropriation
measures abroad.
8This idea is closely related to the literature on ’quid pro quo’ investments, where
multinationals invest in a foreign country to defuse the threat of protection abroad (see
Bhagwati, 1987; Bhagwati et al., 1992).
9More broadly related, in a contribution with an empirical focus, Fredriksson et al.
(2003) assess how lobbying and corruption of state employees affect environmental regu-
lation and inbound FDI into the United States. In their model, the allocation of capital is
endogenous; workers and environmental groups lobby for environmental regulation whereas
capital owners do not.
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Second, our paper belongs to a literature that analyzes the interaction be-
tween environmental regulation and firm locations under increasing returns
to scale. Even though early empirical research found it hard to confirm a
relation between regulation and location, recent contributions provide evi-
dence that regulation has an impact on the location decisions of firms (see
Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004; Levinson and Taylor, 2008).Theoretical
contributions analyze whether the ability of multinationals to relocate pro-
duction leads to pollution havens which have low regulation in order to at-
tract foreign capital or instead to excessively stringent “not-in-my backyard”
(NIMBY) policies (see for instance Markusen et al., 1995; Rauscher, 1995;
Elliott and Zhou, 2013; Erdogan (2013) provides a survey of the literature.).
For instance, Markusen et al. (1993) analyze the location choices of two
Cournot oligopolists that are associated with different countries. These firms
choose between having only their home-country plant, opening an additional
plant in the foreign country and closing down production altogether. Con-
trary to our paper, complete relocation to the other country is not an option.
The paper focuses exclusively on how environmental taxes affect location
choices of the two firms. Regulation is treated as exogenous. Thus, there is
no discussion of the central issue in our paper, namely how the anticipated
location decisions of firms affect regulation itself. Motta and Thisse (1994)
pursue the same questions in a similar model, except that, in their paper,
firms are already established in their home country. The paper only reports
“some tentative results” on the relation between environmental taxes and
welfare for specific parameter values, identifying, in particular, the possi-
bility of discontinuous jumps in welfare at tax levels inducing relocation.10
Most closely related to our paper, Markusen et al. (1995) analyze a tax com-
petition game between two jurisdictions facing a monopolist with increasing
returns who generates local pollution. However, the jurisdictions care only
about consumer surplus; firm lobbying is not an issue. The authors show
that the equilibrium tax levels may be inefficient, resulting in too few or too
many plants. The paper does not deal with the central issue of this paper,
namely how susceptibility to lobbying affects the behavior of jurisdictions,
and how the influence differs between national and multinational firms.
Lobbying in the context of firm location has been analyzed less frequently.
Some contributions address lobbying of regions that compete for or against
the settlement of firms which produce a local public good or bad. For in-
stance, Bellettini and Kempf (2008) analyze the spatial allocation of produc-
10Motta and Thisse define welfare as the sum of home country consumer surplus and
profits minus home country damages plus some fraction of foreign country profits of the
home country firm.
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tion plants when regions lobby a central government to influence the local
presence of a firm. Lobbying may lead to over- or underprovision of the public
good which the firms provide. Closely related, Fredriksson (2000) analyzes
the allocation of a plant which exerts negative externalities in a NIMBY set-
ting where each region lobbies against the location of the plant at its own
site, but benefits from its existence somewhere else. Thus, both papers also
deal with how lobbying influences location patterns. However, our model fo-
cuses on lobbying of firms, rather than lobbying of regions. Like the present
paper, Cole et al. (2006) analyze lobbying activities of multinational and na-
tional firms against environmental regulation when local production causes
pollution damages. The authors show how an increase in the number of for-
eign plants affects environmental regulation in the presence of lobbying. In
contrast to our approach, the market structure is exogenous and relocation
is not allowed.
To sum up, the existing papers on lobbying in the context of FDI and
firm location do not address how the influence activities of firms affect en-
vironmental regulation. The existing papers on the relation between regula-
tion and location choice mostly treat regulation as an exogenous parameter.
Where it is endogenized, the role of lobbying and the differences between
national and multinational firms are not addressed.
3 Assumptions
We consider a multi-stage game of environmental regulation in a small coun-
try: Its environmental regulation does not induce reactions of policy in the
rest of the world, which has a low level of regulation that we normalize to
zero.
3.1 Product market
There are two countries, i = 1 (home) and i = 2 (foreign). There is one
firm that initially only has one plant in the home country. This firm can be
national or multinational. A multinational firm is defined by the option to
build another plant in the foreign country.11 Even for the multinational firm,
we will assume that at least a positive fraction of its its owners live in the
country under consideration.
11Our main insights still hold if both firms can relocate in principle, but a “multina-
tional” firm can do so at lower costs than a “national” firm, reflecting a home bias of the
latter.
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We assume that a politician in country 1 maximizes a “welfare function”
(W ), a weighted sum of consumer surplus in the home country (K), total firm
profits (Π), net of the costs of environmental damage in the home country
(D):
W = K + γΠ−D, (1)
where γ ≥ 0. The game has the following stages:
1. The politician chooses the regulation level r so as to maximize W .
2. If the firm is multinational, it decides whether to build an additional
plant in the foreign location at fixed cost F ; a national firm is defined
by the absence of this option.12
3. The profit-maximizing firm chooses xij, i, j = 1, 2, which denotes the
output levels produced in country i for country j.
We write xi = (xi1 + x
i
2) for total output produced in country i, and
xj =
(
x1j + x
2
j
)
for total output produced for consumption in country j.
Further, we write x = (x11, x
1
2, x
2
1, x
2
2). Partial relocation (P) occurs if x
1 > 0
and x2 > 0, that is, production takes place in both countries. There is
complete relocation (C) if x1 = 0, x2 > 0, that is, all production takes place
in country 2. If x2 = 0 , we say that there is no relocation (N).
We assume that the firm is a monopolist on both markets who faces
linear demand pi = max {a− xi, 0} in country i = 1, 2. We assume constant
marginal production costs, which we set to 0 for simplicity. If a market is
served from another country, the firm incurs transportation (or trade) costs
t > 0 per unit output. Regulation is assumed to increase the marginal costs
of production from zero to r > 0 units per unit of output. Profits of a
regulated multinational are thus
2∑
j=1
pj(xj)xj − rx1 − t
(
x12 + x
2
1
)− δF (2)
where δ = 1 if there is complete or partial relocation, δ = 0 otherwise,
that is, for a national firm or a multinational firm that does not relocate.
Environmental damages are given as b (x1)
2
, where b > 0. In the foreign
country, there is no regulation. Again, we can think of this as a convenient
normalization, except that we are restricting the country under consideration
to introduce regulation that goes beyond the level in other countries.13 The
12Fixed costs in the home country are sunk and cannot be recouped by shutting down
a plant location. They are independent of the type of relocation (partial or complete).
Allowing for differences in the fixed costs of partial and complete relocation does not
change the main insights of the analysis and complicates notation.
13In Appendix E, we relax this assumption as well.
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model thus has the exogenous parameters a, F, b, t, γ. The regulation level r
is endogenous, as is the location choice and more generally the output vector
x.
3.2 Lobbying interpretation
In principle, the parameter γ could reflect the weight that the benevolent
politician gives to producer surplus.14 Our preferred interpretation, however,
is that it reflects the political clout of the firm. For instance, the regulator
could be maximizing a political support function (see Peltzman, 1977) or she
could be engaged in a lobbying game with the firm (see Grossman and Help-
man, 1994). To see the latter point, it is well-known that maximization of (1)
can be interpreted as a reduced-form description of behavior in a lobbying
game. In a first stage of this game the firm offers a contribution schedule
C(r) to the politician, which maps a particular level of regulation to a con-
tribution that the firm pays to the politician. The firm’s objective function
thus becomes pi(r) = Π (r)−C (r), that is, profits minus contributions. Next
the politician sets regulation levels so as to maximize U(r) = Ŵ (r) + βC(r),
where β ≥ 0 and Ŵ (r) = K + γ̂Π−D is the “true” welfare function where
the weight parameter γ̂ reflects normative considerations.
It is straightforward to show that the regulation level resulting from this
more complex game maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and profits. The
weight γ of profits is the sum of the true weight γ̂ and the politicians concern
for private benefits, β. Thus, our simpler game can be regarded as a reduced
form of the more complex lobbying game.
4 Firm behavior
We first describe the behavior of a multinational firm for given regulation.
Intuitively, a multinational firm faces simple trade-offs when it takes loca-
tion decisions. If it does not relocate, it saves fixed costs relative to the
alternatives of complete or partial relocation. Compared to complete relo-
cation, it incurs the costs of regulation. Compared to partial relocation, it
incurs transportation and regulation costs. If it relocates partially rather
than completely, it saves transportation costs, but incurs regulation costs.
14Typically γ ≤ 1 would be assumed, reflecting either distributional preferences for
consumers or foreign ownership of assets. Note that γ is independent of the location
choice, which reflects the idea that the politician identifies the firm as one with national
ownership independent of its production structure.
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The following assumptions guarantee that (i) it is possible to earn positive
profits in a country that is served from abroad and (ii) the profits that can be
obtained in the unregulated foreign country from serving this country locally
outweigh the fixed costs.15
Assumption 1 (i) t < a, (ii) a2 > 4F .
In Appendix A.1, we show that, for optimal output choices, profits in the
different locational regimes are:
ΠN (r) =

1
4
[
2a2 − 2a (t+ 2r) + (t+ r)2 + r2] if r ≤ a− t
1
4
[a2 − 2ar + r2] if a− t < r ≤ a
0 if a < r
ΠP (r) = 1
4
[2a2 − 2ar + r2 − 4F ] if r ≤ a
ΠC (r) = 1
4
[2a2 − 2at+ t2 − 4F ] (3)
ΠN (r), the profit of a multinational firm that does not relocate even though
it is allowed to do so in principle, is the same as the profit of a national
firm that cannot relocate. In the case r ≤ a − t, both markets are served:
The joint costs of transportation and regulation are not too high to prevent
exports. If a − t < r ≤ a, no profits can be earned from serving the foreign
country because the combined costs of transportation and regulation are too
high, whereas regulation is not too costly to stop production altogether. For
a < r regulation alone suffices to choke production even for the home-country
market.
The multinational will choose the location l(r) ∈ {C,N, P} that max-
imizes Πl (r). Straightforward calculations (see Appendix A.2) show that
there are critical levels of regulation, r1 = r1 (a, t, F ) and r2 = r2 (a, t, F )
and r3 = t such that location choice is given as
l(r) =

N if r ≤ min {r1, r2}
P if r1 < r < r3
C if r ≥ max {r3, r2}
(4)
Thus, if regulation increases beyond certain levels, relocation takes place.
Figure 1 gives the location choices for specific parameterizations.16
15To see this, note that (i) t < a guarantees that the maximal willingness-to-pay is
above the transportation costs; (ii) a2/4 is the profit in the unregulated foreign country
(with zero marginal cost).
16As illustrated in this figure, it is possible that r1 = r3, so that the partial relocation
regime disappears, or that r1 = 0, so that partial relocation arises even when there is no
regulation.
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— Figure 1 (about here): Location decisions of the multinational. —
Increases in demand a and reductions in fixed costs F reduce the size of
the no-relocation region.17
For later purposes, we show that the relation between transportation costs
and location patterns identified in Figure 1 holds more generally.
Lemma 1: There exist values t1 = t1(a, F ), t2 = t2(a, F ) such that
(i) For t ≤ t1, the firm chooses no relocation for low values of regulation
and complete relocation for high levels. Partial relocation never arises. (NC)
(ii) For t ≥ t2, the firm chooses partial relocation even for zero regulation
and complete relocation for high levels of regulation (PC).
(iii) For t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, the firm chooses no relocation for low values of
r, partial relocation for intermediate values and complete relocation for high
values. (NPC)
The proof is straightforward (see Appendix A.3).18 The intuition is sim-
ple: (i) When transportation costs t are low, it is never worthwhile to build
a plant in the other country to serve only this country. However, it can
be worthwhile to avoid high regulation costs by relocating completely. (ii)
When transportation costs t are very high, the firm will always serve the
other country locally even when there is no regulation. (iii) For intermediate
cases all locational patterns emerge for suitable r.
5 Determining regulation
We first consider the optimal regulation for a national firm; then we move
to the multinational firm. In Appendix B we derive the expressions for
home-country welfare when the firm serves both markets (r ≤ a − t) and
when it produces only for the national market (a − t < r ≤ a)19. We use
these expressions to characterize how the optimal regulation depends on the
magnitude of the environmental damage, b, and on the firm weight, γ. Let
γ1 ≡ b− 1
2
; γ2 ≡ 2b− 1
2
and γ3 ≡ 2b− a
2(2a−t) . Clearly, γ
1 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ3.
Proposition 1 (i) If γ ≤ γ1, regulation is so high (r = a) that there is no
production of the national firm.
17This result can be derived by straightforward calculation based on the functions de-
scribing the boundaries between the three regions.
18t1 corresponds to the intersection of the boundaries of all three regimes N , P and C,
and t2 corresponds to the value where the “ΠN = ΠP ”-line intersects with the x-axis.
19This also contains the case where the firm closes down production completely (r = a).
We do not discuss the possibility that r > a explicitly, because it is equivalent to r = a.
That the firm produces only for the home market if a − t < r can be seen directly from
the values for the optimal output for N (equations (7) in Appendix A.1).
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(ii) If γ1 < γ ≤ γ2, regulation is just high enough that the national firm only
produces for the home country (r = a− t).
(iii) If γ > γ2, the national firm produces for both countries. If γ < γ3, r
lies strictly between 0 and a − t, and it is decreasing in γ and t, increasing
in a and b. If γ ≥ γ3, r = 0.
Proof : See Appendix C.
The result is intuitive: If the environmental problem is important and
firms do not have much weight (γ < γ1), then production will be shut down
completely. As the influence of firms increases (γ > γ1), regulation will be
softened to allow production for the home country. Eventually (γ > γ2),
regulation becomes so soft that the firm will produce for both countries, and
there will be no regulation if the weight of the firm is sufficiently strong.20
The critical values γ1, γ2, γ3 are increasing in b, because regulation levels
depend on the trade-off between damages and concern for producer rents.
For very low b, there is no regulation (γ3 is negative). As the environmental
problem becomes more severe (b increases), regulation increases gradually
until the firm no longer exports to the foreign country. Finally r becomes so
high that production is shut down altogether.
Appendix C contains a formula for the optimal level of r when there is
an interior solution in the regime where both markets are served. We will
use this solution when we compare the national and multinational firm in
Section 6.
We now characterize the optimal regulation of the multinational firm and
the corresponding location decisions.
Proposition 2 For the multinational firm, there exist critical levels of firm
influence γC1, γC2, γC3, γP2 such that:21
(i) For t ≤ t1, complete relocation arises if and only if γ ≤ γC1, with regula-
tion levels
rC = a− t
2
− 1
2
√
−8F − 4at+ 4a2 + t2;
there is no relocation for γ > γC1, and the regulation level is rN = 0.
(ii) For t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, there is complete relocation if and only if γ ≤ γC2; the
20The result that there never is a solution in the interior of the regime with only home
country production should not be overemphasized: It comes from the fact that, in this
case, because of the specific functional forms we are employing, environmental damages
and consumer surplus are proportional to the square of local output.
21These quantities are defined in Appendix E.
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regulation level is rC = t. There is partial relocation if and only if γC2 < γ ≤
γP2, with regulation level
rP = a− t−
√
a2 − 4F .
There is no relocation if and only if γ > γP2; in this case, regulation is
rN = 0.
(iii) For t > t2, there is complete relocation and regulation rC = t if and only
if γ ≤ γC3. There is partial relocation and rP = 0 if and only if γC3 < γ.
Proof : See Appendix D.
In essence, Proposition 2 states that relocation is fostered by low firm
influence and low transportation costs. To prove this result, one has to take
the effects of regulation on location decisions into account. Appendix B gives
the welfare levels for each regime as WN (r), W P (r) and WC (r), respectively.
WN (r), the welfare in regime N , is the same as for the national firm.
The regulation levels for arbitrary parameterizations of Proposition 2 will
be useful when we compare the regulation of the national and multinational
firm in the next section. The calculations show that a higher damage pa-
rameter b works in favor of relocation, whereas increasing γ works against
it. Furthermore, Proposition 2 shows that partial relocation only arises for
sufficiently high transportation costs (t > t1).
6 National vs. multinational firms
We now ask under which circumstances regulation leads a multinational firm
to produce and pollute less than a national firm. As a first benchmark case,
we consider γ = 0. There are several reasons for choosing this benchmark.
First, it appears to be a natural starting point for an analysis of regulatory
capture by industry. Though even a regulator who is not captured by indus-
try might want to put some weight on industry profits, in the extreme case
where γ = 0 regulatory decisions definitely do not result from regulatory
capture by firms. Second, there are cases where public agencies are supposed
to use consumer standards (Neven and Ro¨ller 2005). Third, previous related
literature usually sets γ = 0.22 Thus, this benchmark is useful to position
our results relative to this literature.
Nevertheless, we also consider another particularly interesting benchmark
case, namely γ = 1. In this case, total surplus is maximized. This could, in
22This is, in particular, true for Markusen et al. (1995) and Rauscher (1995).
12
principle, also arise when a regulator is not captured by lobbyists, but simply
puts equal weight on firms and consumers. We therefore also consider a case
where γ > 1 (namely γ = 1.5) where it is particularly plausible that such a
weight reflects lobbying by the firm.
It will turn out that, for some values of b and t, the multinational firm
produces and pollutes less than the national firm for low γ, but more for high
γ; whereas for other values of b and t, the multinational firm produces and
pollutes more than the national firm for low γ, but less for high γ. However,
there is one robust observation: The region where output and pollution are
higher for multinational firms than for national firms involves more damaging
pollutants.
6.1 Pure consumer surplus maximization
Suppose as a benchmark that γ = 0. We fix a and F , leaving us with the free
parameters t, b. The left panel of Figure 2 captures the relocation patterns
for the multinational (N,P or C), and it shows for which combinations of t
and b the multinational has higher domestic output than the national firm
(white regions), lower domestic output (black) or the same output (grey).
— Figure 2 (about here): Locations and output (a = 4, F = 3): Left:
γ = 0; Middle: γ = 1; Right: γ = 1.5. MNE>Nat: white; MNE=Nat: grey;
MNE<Nat: black. —
Relocation regimes in the (t, b)-diagram are similar to those in the (t, r)-
diagram because more damaging pollutants (high b) induce more regulation
(high r). As to the comparison between the multinational and the national
firm, the figure leads to the following observation:23
Result 1 The following statements hold for the benchmark case γ = 0:
a) The multinational produces less than the national firm (i) for low t and
intermediate values of b and (ii) for high t and low b.
b) The multinational produces more than the national firm for high values of
t and intermediate values of b.
In the remainder of this subsection, we provide the intuition for these
observations. The results hold in general, and Figure 2 illustrates them for a
specific parameterization. The left hand side of Figure 2 represents the case
without lobbying; the right hand side shows how lobbying affects location
structure and output.
23Of course, when the environmental problem becomes sufficiently severe, both firms
face regulation that chokes off pollution.
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To understand the intuition for a)(i), first consider the part of the com-
plete relocation regime C where the national firm is active (low t, intermedi-
ate b). There the multinational firm trivially has lower domestic output than
the national firm, as it does not produce in the home country. For low trans-
portation costs t, the reduction in consumer surplus from relocation is low,
because the multinational will serve the home country from abroad without
substantial price increases. Thus, the regulator is prepared to induce com-
plete relocation of the multinational firm to improve environmental quality.
With a national firm, the environmental benefits from shutting down would
come at the costs of losing consumer surplus altogether, so that the regulator
is more reluctant to close down the national firm.
As to a(ii), for high t, there is partial relocation of the multinational. The
left panel of Figure 2 shows that, in regime P , there is a critical level of b,
below which the multinational produces a lower domestic output than the
national firm. To understand the intuition, we focus on the case t > t2, so
that there is partial relocation even for b = 0.24 The multinational chooses
partial relocation because transportation costs are high: Even for b = 0,
when there is no regulation, it serves the foreign country from abroad. As
the national firm lacks this option, it also produces its exports at home. As a
result, the national firm produces and pollutes more than the multinational
firm.
b) As in a(ii), we continue to suppose that transportation costs are high.
As the damage parameter increases, regulators first start regulating the na-
tional firm, because the benefits from regulating a firm with a larger home-
country output are larger. As b increases within regime P , the regulation of
the national firm eventually becomes so strict that it produces less output
than the multinational firm which is still not regulated. The intuition is as
follows: As environmental damages are large enough, the government wants
the firm to close down export production to reduce pollution. Whereas the
multinational firm does this even for r = 0 (because it has the alternative of
production abroad), the national firm only abolishes export production for
sufficiently strict regulation, r ≥ a − t. This leads to lower output of the
national firm compared to the multinational that faces less regulation.
6.2 Increasing influence of the firm
We now assess the effects of a positive weight of the firm’s profit in the welfare
function (γ = 1), reflecting greater importance of private benefits in the
regulator’s objective function. Clearly, regulation is reduced as γ increases,
24For t1∗ < t < t2, the argument is similar.
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no matter whether the firm is national or multinational. The more interesting
question is whether it becomes more or less likely that the multinational faces
less regulation than the national firm, and what the welfare effects are.
The middle panel in Figure 2 considers the case where consumer and
producer surplus get the same weight(γ = 1); the panel on the right reflects a
situation where producer surplus gets higher weight (γ = 1.5). As γ increases,
the parameter region where the multinational firm produces and pollutes
more moves upwards. More precisely, we obtain the following observation.
Result 2 As firm weight increases, (i) for low transportation costs, the area
where the multinational firm produces lower output and pollution than the
national firm is characterized by higher values of b; (ii) for high transporta-
tion costs, the area where the multinational firm produces higher output and
pollution than the national firm is characterized by higher b.
We now provide the intuition for the result. Comparison of the panels in
Figure 2 shows that an increase in γ has the following effects:
(i) The complete relocation regime shifts upwards, because multinational
lobbying prevents restrictive regulation. However, as the national firm also
has stronger weight than before, the region where they have to close down
is also pushed upwards. As a result, for low t, both the lower and the upper
bound of the region where the multinational firm produces strictly less output
than the national firm moves up.
(ii) The second effect arises only in the partial relocation regime P , that is,
for high t. The intuition is similar as in case (i). As the firms’ weight grows,
it face less regulation, no matter whether it is national or multinational.
This leads to an upward shift in the regime boundaries. First, as in the
case γ = 0, for higher values of γ there is a critical level of b above which
the multinational firm produces higher domestic output than the national
firm. However, this requires that the national firm is regulated so heavily
that exports are curbed, which will only happen for higher values of the
damage parameters than for the case without lobbying (γ = 0). Similarly,
the upper boundary of the region where the multinational produces more
than the national firm is determined by the point where the multinational
completely relocates. Again, this point moves upwards as the multinational’s
influence increases.
As a final observation, note the following non-monotonicity in the effects
of increasing firm influence γ: For some values of b and t (e.g. t = 3,
b = 0.8), increasing γ from 0 to 1 leads to from a situation where pollution
of the national and multinational firm is the same to a situation where the
multinational pollutes more. Increasing γ from 1 to 1.5 then leads to a
situation where multinational firms pollute less.
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7 Welfare
The results in the previous section strongly suggest that the presence of
multinational firms has ambiguous effects on welfare. On the one hand,
where the multinational is induced to relocate, local pollution will decline.
On the other hand, relocation may lead to reductions in consumer surplus.
However, by choosing regulation accordingly, the government can avoid
relocation if desired. At first glance, it might therefore seem that a country
is always better off with a multinational firm, because this adds the option
of inducing exit of an undesired firm without losing consumer surplus com-
pletely. However, with a multinational firm the government loses the option
to regulate the firm heavily and nevertheless have local production – the firm
will vote with the feet when regulation gets too stringent.
— Figure 3 (about here): Welfare (a = 4, F = 3): Left: γ = 0; Middle:
γ = 1; Right: γ = 1.5. MNE>Nat: white; MNE=Nat: grey; MNE<Nat:
black. —
In spite of these potential ambiguities, our model yields a very clear result:
For γ = 0, a country is always better off when the monopolist is multina-
tional rather than national, except for a small region where regulation and
welfare are identical for both types of firms. The left hand side of Figure 3
represents the welfare comparison absent lobbying. Welfare is the same with
a national or multinational firm if the multinational prefers to stay at home
(grey area). For all other parameter regions, welfare is higher if the firm is a
multinational. The intuition can be obtained from this figure, which is closely
related to Figure 2. First, consider regime C: When the environmental dam-
age is so substantial that the production of the national firm is choked off
entirely whereas the multinational produces abroad, welfare is clearly higher
with the multinational. This reflects the fact that the multinational still gen-
erates consumer surplus for the home country (without causing pollution at
home). As the environmental damage parameter declines, the national firm
is regulated less, so that it at least produces for the local market: Contrary to
the multinational firm, the national firm therefore generates environmental
damage, but because transportation costs are fairly small, so are the losses
in consumer surplus from having a multinational rather than a local firm.
In regime P , first consider low damage parameters. Then, contrary to the
multinational firm, the national firm produces for both countries. The ad-
ditional output for the foreign country creates more pollution than in the
case of the multinational without generating more consumer surplus. As the
pollution parameter increases, so that the government wants to curb exports
of the national firm, strict regulation is necessary to induce this, so that the
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multinational firm generates higher consumer surplus without substantially
more pollution.25
The situation changes when lobbying is taken into account. The two re-
maining panels in Figure 3, which correspond to the middle and right panel
in Figure 2, compare welfare (defined as pure consumer surplus minus dam-
ages) for the national and the multinational firm when firms have a positive
weight (γ = 1 and γ = 1.5). The figure shows that in both of these cases
there is a region where welfare with a multinational firm is lower than with
a national firm (shaded dark). In this region, there is partial relocation, and
the multinational firm produces more than the national firm. As discussed
in Section 6, the multinational firm is regulated less than the national firm
because strict regulation of the national firm is necessary to prevent export
production from the home country, whereas partial relocation of the multi-
national does not necessarily require very strict regulation.26 This increases
environmental damages and reduces welfare compared to the national firm.
Note the qualitative difference between increasing γ from 0 to 1 and from
1 to 1.5: The first increase introduces an area where welfare is lower with
multinational firms; the second increase moves it upwards, that is, requires
a higher environmental damage parameter for its emergence.
We sum up the observations from Figure 3 as follows.
Result 3 For γ = 0, welfare is always higher with a multinational firm than
with a national firm. As γ increases, parameter regions emerge where welfare
is lower with the multinational.
This result illustrates the effects of lobbying on welfare: Even though our
setting is biased in the sense that a consumer-surplus maximizing government
is always better off with a multinational, this changes with lobbying: There
are parameter regions (with fairly high environmental damage parameter)
where the increasing influence activities reverse the welfare comparison.
8 Discussion and generalizations
In a simple monopoly model, we investigated whether national or multina-
tional firms pollute more heavily in the home country. We also dealt with the
25We want to point out the clear result for γ = 0 is due to the model specification where
both the consumer surplus and the damage function are quadratic in output. For other
functional forms, the area where welfare with the multinational is lower than with the
national firm may already emerge for γ = 0.
26Recall that, to economize on transportation cost, a multinational firm may even choose
partial relocation without any regulation.
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relation between lobbying, firm type and welfare. One might be concerned
about the robustness of the conclusions. In Appendix E, we introduce a
model with more general assumptions on the demand structure, the nature
of regulation and the damage function that are compatible with our specific
example. We briefly discuss this model in Section 8.1. In Section 8.2, we
then consider various conceivable modifications of the model, and we discuss
to which extent they can be addressed in the more general setting.
8.1 The general model
In Appendix E, we show that most of the major conclusions apply in a more
general setting. Rather than specifying a particular parametric model, we
formulate assumptions on the relation between the regulatory instrument
and product market outcomes that are satisfied in various contexts including
the model previously introduced. For instance, we assume that outputs and
profits in a country are positive without regulation. Moreover, they decrease
as regulation becomes more stringent, until they finally become zero as a
prohibitive level of regulation is reached.
In this setting, we show that the location choices of the firm have the same
qualitative properties as in Section 4: First, there never is complete relocation
when there is no regulation in the home country.27 Second, if regulation and
transportation costs are small, no relocation occurs. Third, if foreign country
regulation is not too strict to prevent positive profits (net of relocation costs)
from serving the home country from abroad, complete relocation occurs for
sufficiently strict regulation in the home country. Fourth, whether reloca-
tion is partial or complete depends on the interaction between regulation
and transportation costs: For low transportation costs, partial relocation is
never optimal, while for higher transportation costs partial relocation can be
optimal and no relocation is never chosen.
We then go on to show that the comparison between national and multi-
national firms identified in Section 6.1 is still valid in this more general set-
ting. To this end, we assume that the regulator maximizes a weighted sum
of consumer surplus (minus damages) and profits, where consumer surplus
depends positively on output sold in the home country and damages depend
positively on outputs produced in the home country. Moreover, we assume
that the optimal regulation is continuous in parameters, and that it involves
zero home-country output as the damage parameter becomes high enough.
In this setting, the main results are as follows. As in the specific model
treated above, for low transportation costs, governments choose regulation so
27Note that in this case partial relocation may occur due to high transportation costs.
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that the multinational exercises the option of relocation when environmen-
tal damages are high (and hence regulation becomes stricter); the national
firm then produces and pollutes at least as much as the multinational. As
transportation costs increase, there is another region where the national firm
pollutes more, but the reasons are different: The multinational firm chooses
partial relocation and is therefore less active. What we cannot show in the
general model is that there necessarily is a region where the multinational
firm pollutes more in the home country than the national firm. However, it
is also not evident why this result should be an artefact of the specific model
of Section 4.
8.2 Discussion of specific assumptions
8.2.1 Objective function of the regulator
In the objective function of the regulator (1), the weight on profits is the
same for national and multinational firms, and it is independent of whether
the monopolist produces entirely at home or in the foreign country. This
is clearly a simplification: One could imagine that a regulator puts a higher
weight on national firms than on multinational firms and that she cares more
about the profits of a multinational firm earned in the home country than
about those earned in the foreign country. This point is also relevant with
our preferred interpretation of the weight as reflecting lobbying incentives
(rather than the weight that a benevolent regulator would put on profits):
A home country firm might have easier access to the regulator than a firm
located abroad, which could make it a more effective lobbyist. However,
recall that, at the time that lobbying takes place, the firm is present in the
home country, no matter whether it is a national or a multinational firm and
whether it will subsequently relocate or not. We thus believe that, in this
context, the assumption of symmetric profit weights is fairly innocuous.
If one were to nevertheless put a higher weight on home-country profits of
the multinational firm than on the profits they earn abroad, this would clearly
increase the incentives to keep the firm at home (which in the current version
of the model come exclusively from the desire to increase consumer surplus
by saving on transportation costs). Thus, we conjecture that the parameter
region with partial or complete relocation of the monopolist would become
smaller.
8.2.2 Technology
We assume a very simple linear relation between output and pollution. The
more general model in the appendix does not rely on linearity. As discussed
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above, apart from symmetry assumptions, we merely use several innocuous
assumptions: For instance, outputs and profits are positive without regula-
tion, but react negatively to regulation in a given country, until a prohibitive
level is reached. These assumptions suffice to generate the qualitative in-
sights on firm behavior. Adding similarly standard assumptions on welfare
then leads to a generalization of Proposition 2.
A more challenging issue is the realistic possibility of multi-dimensional
choices of the firm. In our model, there is no way to react to home-country
regulation in any other way than by output contraction (including the pos-
sibility of relocation). A more general option would be to allow the firm to
change outputs as well as emissions per unit of output. This modification is
beyond the scope of the paper, but, to the best of our knowledge, has not
been treated elsewhere in the literature on location choice either.
8.2.3 Other policy instruments
So far, we assumed that regulation imposes a cost on the firm without gen-
erating revenues for the state. Most related papers assume taxes.28 Environ-
mental taxes have received a lot of attention for their efficiency properties
(as reflected in particular in the “double dividend” discussion). Nevertheless,
command-and-control regulation is still very common, in particular, in the
context of local pollution. It thus seems natural to consider such regulation
in a positive analysis of regulatory behavior.
Having said that, it is still interesting to consider how the analysis would
change with taxes. Intuitively, for a regulator who does not care about firm
profits, taxes have the desirable feature that they redistribute income away
from firms. Compared with a marginal cost-increasing regulation with the
same induced cost per unit, it is more attractive to increase a tax because
of the revenue received. However, the concern for revenues also implies that
a regulator will be more reluctant to induce exit of the firm than in the
case with a pure marginal cost-increasing regulation. This should exert a
downward pressure on regulation. The net effect of using taxes rather than
regulations is thus not clear. However, the analysis of Markusen et al. (1995)
in a somewhat different setting at least suggests that taxes set by regulators
who maximize consumer surplus can be excessively high or excessively low.
When firm profits enter the regulator’s objective (for instance, because
of lobbying), additional considerations are necessary. If lobbying is so strong
that firm profits receive more weight than consumer surplus, taxation has
28See for example Motta and Thisse (1994); Markusen et al. (1995); Rauscher (1995).
Markusen et al. (1993) briefly discuss other interpretations of their framework.
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a negative net redistributive effect for the regulator, which will reduce in-
centives to increase taxes for any given location structure. By analogous
arguments as above, however, such a regulator is not concerned about re-
duced tax income from relocation, and she will therefore do less to prevent
relocation.
In brief, the exact comparison between taxes and corresponding standards
is not obvious. However, qualitatively, the behavior should be similar: The
generalized model in the appendix also applies to taxes. Using Propositions 3
and 4, one can therefore show that the effect of taxes on location corresponds
to the patterns identified in Section 4, and the differences in the regulation of
national and multinational firms are similar to the case of standards discussed
in Sections 3-7.
8.2.4 Global pollutants
Like much of the related literature, we focus on local pollutants.29 Intuitively,
with global pollutants, there are smaller incentives for regulation in general,
as only a small part of the benefits is captured by the regulating country.
Moreover, there is no incentive whatsoever to follow a NIMBY policy and
induce relocation for environmental reasons.
Nevertheless, we conjecture that there would still be differences between
national and multinational firms: With global pollution, there still is the
“race-to-the bottom”-argument for lax regulation towards multinational firms.
Thus, we conjecture that, no matter what the weight of the firm is, multina-
tional firms would be regulated less than national firms with global pollution:
As transportation costs are positive, consumer surplus is higher when the firm
is in the home country. As the negative effect of pollution is independent
of location, it is thus unambiguously beneficial for the regulator to avoid
relocation.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we compare regulatory policies of a small country that is
influenced by the lobbying activities of a multinational firm. Regulation has
an impact on location decisions of the monopolist. Consumer surplus net
of environmental damages is always higher for a multinational firm than for
a national firm when the regulator cares only about consumers. Thus, the
regulator can avoid local pollution damages by driving the multinational out
of the market and relying on imports whenever this is preferable from a
29Rauscher (1995) also considers global pollutants.
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welfare perspective. The option of importing is not available with a national
firm.
As lobbying influence increases, the region where the multinational pro-
duces and pollutes more now involves pollutants with higher damage param-
eters. Thus lobbying may have worse effects on welfare with a multinational
firm than with a national firm. In particular, even though welfare is always
higher with multinational than with national firms in the absence of lobbying,
this is no longer the case with lobbying.
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Appendices
A The location decisions of the multinational
A.1 Deriving equation (3)
Using (2), profits in the different locations are
ΠN = p1x
1
1 + p2x
1
2 − r
(
x11 + x
1
2
)− tx12 (5)
ΠP = p1x
1
1 + p2x
2
2 − rx11 − F (6)
ΠC = p1x
2
1 + p2x
2
2 − tx21 − F .
Simple calculations show that the optimal output levels are
x11 = max
(
a− r
2
, 0
)
, x12 = max
(
a− r − t
2
, 0
)
in regime N
x11 =
a− r
2
, x22 =
a
2
in regime P (7)
x21 =
a− t
2
, x22 =
a
2
in regime C.
Inserting these choices into (5), we obtain (3).
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A.2 Locational choices
We now derive locational choices (4). Using (3), we first make pairwise
comparisons of profits in the different regimes:
ΠN > ΠP ⇒
{
r2 + t2 + 2rt− 2ar − 2at+ 4F > 0 if r ≤ a− t
−a2 + 4F > 0 if a− t < r
ΠP > ΠC ⇒
{
t > r if r ≤ a
never if a < r
ΠN > ΠC ⇒

r2 + rt− 2ar + 2F > 0 if r ≤ a− t
r2 − t2 − a2 + 2at− 2ar + 4F > 0 if a− t < r ≤ a
0 > 2a2 − 2at+ t2 − 4F if a < r
For regime N to be chosen, we need ΠN > ΠP ∧ΠN > ΠC . For r ≤ a− t we
therefore need :
r2 + t2 + 2rt− 2ar − 2at+ 4F > 0 ∧ r2 + rt− 2ar + 2F > 0.
For a− t < r ≤ a, N is optimal if
−a2 + 4F > 0 ∧ r2 − t2 − a2 + 2at− 2ar + 4F > 0.
For r > a, the condition becomes
−a2 + 4F > 0 ∧ 0 > (a− t)2 + a2 − 4F.
Due to assumption 1(ii), a2 > 4F , the second and the third case cannot
occur. For the first case (r ≤ a − t), simple derivations show that the two
conditions can be written as
r < min
{
a− t−
√
a2 − 4F , a− t
2
− 1
2
√
(t− 2a)2 − 8F
}
.
Defining
r1 ≡ a− t−
√
a2 − 4F and r2 ≡ a− t
2
− 1
2
√
(t− 2a)2 − 8F , (8)
the first statement in (4) follows.
For regime P to be chosen, we need ΠP > ΠN ∧ ΠP > ΠC . For r ≤ a − t ,
we thus require
r2 + t2 + 2rt− 2ar − 2at+ 4F < 0 ∧ t > r.
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For r > a− t, the condition for P to be optimal is
−a2 + 4F < 0 ∧ t > r.
Again, straightforward calculations show that location P is chosen in the
following cases:
for r ≤ a− t : a− t−
√
a2 − 4F < r < t
for r > a− t : −a2 + 4F < 0 ∧ r < t
Using a2 − 4F > 0 and the fact that C is chosen in the remaining cases,
where neither N nor P will be chosen, leads to the equations (4) for l(r).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Define t1 = a−
√
a2−4F
2
and t2 = a−√a2 − 4F . Using (4) and (8): regimes N ,
P and C intersect at t1, and t2 corresponds to the value where the “ΠN =
ΠP”-line intersects with the x-axis.
B The expressions for welfare
Simple calculations show:
KN =
∫ x11
0
(a− q)dq − (a− x11)x11 =
(x11)
2
2
KP =
∫ x11
0
(a− q)dq − (a− x11)x11 =
(x11)
2
2
KC =
∫ x21
0
(a− q)dq − (a− x21)x21 =
(x21)
2
2
(9)
DN = b(x11 + x
1
2)
2
DP = b(x11)
2
DC = 0 (10)
The welfare levels in the different locational regimes are then (taking Π
from (5)):
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WN =
(x11)
2
2
+ γ[(a− x11)x11 + (a− x12)x12 − r(x11 + x12)− tx12]
−b(x11 + x12)2
W P =
(x11)
2
2
+ γ[(a− x11)x11 + (a− x22)x22 − r(x11)− F ]− b(x11)2
WC =
(x21)
2
2
+ γ[(a− x21)x21 + (a− x22)x22 − t(x21)− F ] (11)
Inserting the values for the output from above (equation (7)) and dis-
cerning the cases as above gives 30:
WN (r) =

if r ≤ a− t : γ
4
[2a2 + 2r2 + t2 + 2rt− 4ar − 2at]
+1
8
(a− r)2 − b
4
(2a− 2r − t)2
if a− t < r ≤ a : γ
4
(a− r)2 + 1
8
(a− r)2 − b
4
(a− r)2
if a < r : 0
W P (r) =
{
if r ≤ a : γ
4
[2a2 + r2 − 2ar − 4F ] + 1
8
(a− r)2
− b
4
(a− r)2
WC (r) =
γ
4
[
2a2 + t2 − 2at− 4F ]+ 1
8
(a− t)2 . (12)
C Regulation of national firms
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) The welfare levels corresponding to r ≥ a (No Production), r ≤ a − t
(Full Production) and a − t ≤ r ≤ a (No Exports) are given in equation
(12). We first show that the optimal r and the corresponding welfare levels
correspond to the values shown inTable 1.
(a1) Clearly, for r ≥ a, welfare is 0, independent of r.
(a2) For r ≤ a− t, firms produce both for both markets. Using the F.O.C
for unconstrained maximization of WN(r),
r =
a(−4γ − 1 + 8b) + t(−4b+ 2γ)
−4γ − 1 + 8b
is a candidate interior solution. However, this candidate is only in [0, a− t]
if 2b − 1
2
≤ γ < 2b − a
2(2a−t) . For γ < 2b − 12 , WN(r) is increasing in r on
30In regime P, we ignore the case r > a: In this case, the home market would not be
served, so that complete relocation is always preferred.
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[0, a− t], so that the optimum is r = a − t. For γ > 2b − a
2(2a−t) , W
N(r) is
decreasing in r, so the optimum is r = 0. Table 1 also contains the resulting
welfare levels.
(a3) For a − t ≤ r ≤ a, it turns out that WN(r) is always monotone,
resulting in an optimum r = a if γ < b− 1
2
and r = a− t if γ > b− 1
2
.
(b) Next, we compare welfare in the candidate solutions. (b1) If γ < γ1 ≡
b − 1
2
, the optimal solution is r = a − t in the full production regime and it
is r = a in the no exports regime. Comparing the expressions for welfare, we
obtain that r = a and W = 0. Hence, part (i) of the result follows.
(b2) If b− 1
2
< γ < γ2 ≡ 2b− 1
2
, the candidate optimum in both regimes
is r = a− t. Hence, part (ii) of the result follows.
(b3) If 2b− 1
2
≤ γ < γ3 ≡ 2b− a
2(2a−t) , the optimum in the full production
regime is given by the interior solution. It has to be compared with the
optimum in the No Exports regime (r = a − t). Using the corresponding
expressions in Table 1, it turns out that the full production optimum is
superior.
(b4) If γ > γ3, the optimum in the full production regime is r = 0, the
optimum in the No Exports regime is r = a − t. Using the corresponding
expressions for welfare in Table 1, it follows that full production is superior.
Together with (b3), this implies Part (iii) of the result.
range of γ r = WN =
γ < b− 1
2
a 0
b− 1
2
< γ < 2b− 1
2
a− t t2(γ
4
+ 1
8
− b
4
)
2b− 1
2
≤ γ < 2b− a
2(2a−t)
a(−4γ−1+8b)+t(−4b+2γ)
−4γ−1+8b
t1
(1+2ω)2
[
γ
4
(2ω2 + 2ω + 1) + ω
2
8
− b
4
]
2b− a
2(2a−t) < γ 0 (2a
2 + t(t− 2a))γ
4
+ a2 1
8
− b
4
(t− 2a)2
Table 1: Optimal values for the regulation r and corresponding welfare levels
for the national firm (ω := −4b+ 2γ)
D Regulation of multinational firms
The proof of Proposition 2 requires several preliminary results.
Lemma 2: Welfare under complete relocation is
WC =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
)
(a− t)2 + γ
4
(
a2 − 4F) .
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The corresponding minimal regulation is rC = a− t
2
−1
2
√−8F − 4at+ 4a2 + t2
or rC = t.
The result follows directly from (12). Intuitively, as the firm serves both
countries from abroad, there is no home country pollution. The home country
consumer surplus has to be calculated taking into account the transportation
costs t, and similarly for total profits. As WC is independent of regulation,
any value of r inducing complete relocation can be chosen. A natural candi-
date is the lowest possible value that induces C, thus the lower boundary of
the complete relocation region in the (t, r)-graph. These values for r can be
taken from Appendix A.
Lemma 3: (i) If γ < b− 1
2
the constrained optimal choice of r in P lies
on the upper boundary of P ( r = t). The resulting welfare level is
W P =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
)
(a− t)2 + γ
4
(
a2 − 4F)− b
4
(a− t)2
(ii) If γ > b − 1
2
the constrained optimal choice of r in P lies on the
lower boundary of P, which is r = a − t −√a2 − 4F in NPC and r = 0 in
PC. The corresponding welfare levels are
W P−NPC =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
− b
4
)(
t+
√
a2 − 4F
)2
+
γ
4
(
a2 − 4F) (13)
W P−PC =
(
γ
4
+
1
8
− b
4
)
a2 +
γ
4
(
a2 − 4F) (14)
Proof of Lemma 3: The derivative of W P (r) is 1
4
(r − a) (2γ − 2b+ 1).
In regime P, r ≤ a. Therefore, W P is monotone increasing in r for γ < b− 1
2
and decreasing for γ > b− 1
2
. Thus in the former case the constrained opti-
mum in P lies on the upper boundary of P, in the latter case it lies on the
lower boundary (which is at a− t−√a2 − 4F or at 0).
We use these results and Proposition 1 to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2:
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We define the critical levels of γ as follows:
γC1 ≡ max
{−a+ 8ab− 4bt
4a− 2t ,
(t− 2a)(t+ 2b(t− 2a))
8F
}
γC2 ≡ max

b− 1
2
min
(
b(t+
√
a2−4F)2
t
√
a2−4F−2F+at − 12 , 2b− a2(a−t)
)
min
(
b(t+
√
a2−4F)2
t
√
a2−4F−2F+at − 12 ,
2b(2a−t)2−t(2a−t)
8F
)

γP2 ≡ max
 2b−
a
2(a−t) ,
2b(2t
√
a2−4F+4at−3a2−4F)−(t2+2t
√
a2−4F−4F)
2(2t
√
a2−4F+2at−8F)

γC3 ≡ ba
2
t(2a− t) −
1
2
(i) We show that for t < t1 complete relocation arises if and only if γ <
max
{
−a+8ab−4bt
4a−2t ,
(t−2a)(t+2b(t−2a))
8F
}
. We distinguish four cases:
(a) Let γ < b − 1
2
. In this case, WN = 0 according to Proposition 1, so
that WC > WN and complete relocation is optimal.
(b) Let b− 1
2
< γ < 2b− 1
2
: The optimality condition for the national firm
involves r = a− t and the resulting welfare level is given by t2 (γ
4
+ 1
8
− b
4
)
.
The resulting condition for WC > WN is
−bt
2
4
< (a2 − 2at)(γ
4
+
1
8
) +
γ
4
(a2 − 4F).
Using t < a−
√
a2−4F
2
and thus a2 − 2at > 0, we derive that the inequality
always holds.
(c) For 2b− 1
2
< γ < −a+8ab−4bt
4a−2t , the national firm is optimally regulated
so that it produces for both countries. Again, we have WC > WN and
optimality of C.
(d) Finally, for −a+8ab−4bt
4a−2t < γ, the optimal regulation of the national
firm is r = 0. It turns out that WC > WN and complete relocation is op-
timal in case γ < (t−2a)(t+2b(t−2a))
8F
, otherwise no relocation N is optimal, i.e.
WN > WC .
(ii) We have to show that for t1 < t < t2 the location choice is made as
described in the proposition. We distinguish three cases:
(a) For γ < b− 1
2
, comparing W P and WC from Lemma 2 above and WN
from table 1 shows that C is optimal.
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(b) For b − 1
2
< γ < 2b − a
2(2a−t) , comparison of the relevant expressions
for WN and W P from above shows that always W P > WN and that thus N
is never chosen. Comparing W P and WC leads to C being optimal for γ <
b(t+
√
a2−4F )2
2at+2t
√
a2−4F−4F − 12 and P for the opposite (calculations are straightforward
but tedious; cf. notes p22-25).
(c) For 2b − a
2(2a−t) < γ, comparison of all three location choices is nec-
essary. Pairwise comparison of the relevant expressions for welfare yields
WC > W P ⇔ γ < b(t+
√
a2−4F )2
4a−2t − 12 , WC > WN ⇔ γ < 2b(2a−t)
2−t(2a−t)
8F
, and
W P > WN ⇔ γ < 2b(2t
√
a2−4F+4at−3a2−4F )
2(2t
√
a2−4F+2at−8F ) −
(t2+2t
√
a2−4F−4F )
2(2t
√
a2−4F+2at−8F ) .
Combining all these conditions for optimality of a certain regime yields
part (ii) of the proposition.
(iii) We have to show that, for t > t2, there is complete relocation if and
only if γ ≤ γC3 ≡ ba2
t(2a−t) − 12 .
(a) For γ < b − 1
2
, Lemma 3(i) shows that the optimum in P is on the
upper boundary of P and the welfare level is given by the expression for W P
given there. Comparison with the expression for WC from Lemma 2 above
shows that WC > W P .
(b) For γ > b − 1
2
, welfare under partial relocation is given by equation
(14). It follows that WC > W P for b > (2γ+1)t(2a−t)
2a2
(as a2 > 2at − t2, this
is compatible with the first condition on γ: γ > b− 1
2
). Rearranging terms,
this translates into C for b − 1
2
< γ < ba
2
t(2a−t) − 12 and P for ba
2
t(2a−t) − 12 < γ
(as (a− t)2 > 0 we have b− 1
2
< ba
2
t(2a−t) − 12 and these ranges are possible).
E The general model
We now show that the main insights of our analysis hold much more generally.
We work with assumptions on the demand structure, the nature of regulation
and the damage function which are compatible with our specific example.
As before, we suppose there are two countries i = 1, 2 and one firm, which
originally has a plant in country 1. However, regulation in country 2 can be
positive as well. We denote regulation levels as ri. There are parameters
capturing market demand a > 0, transportation costs t ≥ 0, relocation costs
F ≥ 0 and environmental damages b ≥ 0. Let θ = (a, b, t, F ). The firm
has three options for location decisions, namely “no relocation” (“N”), i.e. it
produces in country 1 only, “complete relocation” (“C”), i.e. it produces in
country 2 only, and “partial relocation” (“P”), where production for country
1 takes place in country 1, production for country 2 takes place in country
29
two. We use the notation l (r1, r2;θ) to denote locational decisions N,P or C.
E.1 Profits and locational choices
We let piij (ri; a, t) denote the optimal profits of a firm that serves country
j from country i (gross of relocation costs); total gross profits of a firm
having taken the locational decision l are thus pil (ri, rj; a, t) ≡ pii1 (ri; a, t) +
pij2 (rj; a, t), with i = 1 = j for l =N, i = 2 = j for l =C, and i = 1, j = 2
for l =P. We let xij (ri; a, t), xl (ri, rj; a, t) denote the corresponding outputs.
Πl (ri, rj; a, t) = pil (ri, rj; a, t)− F denotes net profits.
Assumption 2 Let i = 1, 2.
(a) For i, j = 1, 2 and all a > 0; t > 0, there exists an rmax = rmax(a, t) such
that xij (ri; a, t) ≡ 0 and piij (ri; a, t) ≡ 0 for ri ≥ rmax.
(b) For ri ≤ rmax, piij and xij are (i) decreasing in ri and (ii) increasing in
a; (iii) decreasing in t for i 6= j and independent of t for i = j. As long as
xij > 0, the statements can be replaced with “strictly increasing” and “strictly
decreasing”, respectively.
(c) (i) xij (ri; a, t) ≡ xji (rj; a, t) and piij (ri; a, t) ≡ piji (rj; a, t)
(ii) x1j (r1; a, 0) ≡ x2j (r2; a, 0) and pi1j (r1; a, 0) ≡ pi2j (r2; a, 0) for r1 = r2,
(d) xij and piij are continuous in all arguments.
(e) limt→∞ piij (ri; a, t) = piji (rj; a, t) = 0 (for i 6= j),
lima→0 piij (ri; a, t) = 0 for j = 1, 2.
(f) xii(0; a, t) > 0 and piii(0; a, t) > 0.
These assumptions are fairly general. (a) states that there is a prohibitive
level of regulation; (b) stipulates that outputs and profits react to changes of
regulation and to market parameters in the expected way; (c) requires that
countries and firms are symmetric and differ only according to the type of
regulation. Assumptions (d) and (e) are innocuous regularity properties; (f)
states that outputs and profits are positive without regulation.
We show that the qualitative properties of Figure 1 hold if Assumption 2
does.
Proposition 3 (i) For all r2 ≥ 0 and all θ, l (0, r2;θ) 6= C.
(ii) For all (r2;θ) there exists r
∗
1 > 0 and t
∗ > 0 such that ∀r1 < r∗1 and
∀t < t∗, l (r1, r2;θ) = N .
(iii) For all (r2;θ) such that pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F there exists r∗ = r∗(r2;θ) > 0
such that l (r1, r2;θ) = C for r1 > r
∗.
(iv) For all (r1, r2, a, F ) there exists a t
∗ > 0 such that l (r1, r2;θ) 6= P for
t < t∗. If pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F , then there is a t∗∗ such that l (r1, r2;θ) 6= N for
t > t∗∗.
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Proof: (i) We have to show that serving country 1 from country 2 is never
worthwhile for r1 = 0, i.e. pi11(0; a, t) ≥ pi21(r2; a, t) for all r2. By Assump-
tion 2c(ii) pi11(0; a, 0) = pi21(0; a, 0). By b(i) pi21(r2; a, 0) ≤ pi21(0; a, 0) for all
r2 ≥ 0. Thus pi11(0; a, 0) ≥ pi21(r2; a, 0). By b(iii) pi11(0; a, 0) = pi11(0; a, t)
and pi21(r2; a, 0) ≥ pi21(r2; a, t). Hence pi11(0; a, t) ≥ pi21(r2; a, t).
(ii) By (cii) pi11 (0; a, 0) = pi21 (0; a, 0) , therefore by Assumption (bi), pi11 (0; a, 0) ≥
pi21 (r2; a, 0) for all r2. Similarly, pi12 (0; a, 0) ≥ pi22 (r2; a, 0). Because F > 0,
therefore, relocation is never worthwhile for r1 = t = 0. By continuity (d),
the result also holds if r1 and t are sufficiently small.
(iii) By Assumption 2(a), pi1j (r1; a, t) = 0 for r1 ≥ rmax and j = 1, 2, so that
production in country 1 is not worthwhile. However, as pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F by
assumption, a firm that relocates complete obtains a positive profit. Thus,
complete relocation is worthwhile for r1 ≥ rmax.
(iv) First, we show that, if partial relocation is better than no relocation
and t = 0, then complete relocation is better than partial relocation: Partial
relocation necessarily requires pi12 (r1; a, 0) < pi22 (r2; a, 0). By Assumption
2(c) and (biii), pi12 (r1; a, 0) = pi11 (r1; a, 0) and pi22 (r2; a, 0) = pi21 (r2; a, 0).
Therefore pi11 (r1; a, 0) < pi21 (r2; a, 0) , so that serving country 1 from abroad
is more profitable than serving it from home. By continuity (assumption 2d),
there then exists a t∗ > 0 such that complete relocation is optimal for t < t∗.
Fix r2, a, F and t. By Assumption 2(e), limt→∞ pi12 (r1; a, t) = 0. Because
pi22 (r2; a, t) ≥ F , partial or complete relocation is optimal for sufficiently
high t and no relocation is never chosen.
The proposition reflects the relocation structure of our specific model in
a more general context. As to (i), complete relocation does not occur when
there is no regulation in the home country.31 (ii) says that, if regulation and
transportation costs are small, no relocation occurs. By (iii), provided that
foreign country regulation is not too strict to prevent positive profits net of
relocation costs, complete relocation occurs for sufficiently high regulation in
the home country. (iv) states that whether relocation is partial or complete
depends on the interaction between regulation and transportation costs: For
low transportation costs, partial relocation is never optimal, while for higher
transportation costs partial relocation can be optimal and no relocation is
never chosen.
31Note that in this case partial relocation may occur due to high transportation costs.
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E.2 The choice of regulation
We now introduce additional assumptions so that we can address the choice
of regulation.
Assumption 3 (a) The regulator maximizes a weighted sum of consumer
surplus (minus damages) and profits.
(b) Consumer surplus is a strictly increasing function of xi.
(c) Damages are continuous, weakly increasing functions of xi and b. For
b > 0, they are strictly increasing in xi; for positive xi, they are strictly in-
creasing in b. For b = 0, damages are 0 for all xi and hence the optimal
regulation is 0.
(d) For national and multinational firms, the optimal regulation is a contin-
uous function of all parameters as long as no change of location is induced.
As b→∞, the optimal regulation involves xi = 0.
We now ask to which extent the comparative analysis (Result 1) for the
pure consumer surplus case generalizes.
Proposition 4 Suppose γ = 0.
(a) Fix a, F and r2.
(i) For every level of transportation costs, there exists a value of b such that
neither the national nor the multinational firm produces any output for b > b.
(ii) If t is sufficiently small, but positive, there exists b > 0 such that both
firms produce the same output level for b < b.
(b) Fix a and F . Suppose r2 is sufficiently small. (i) If t is sufficiently
small, there exist b∗ and b∗ such that b∗ < b∗ and multinational firms pro-
duce less home-country output than national firms for b ∈ (b∗, b∗). (ii) If t
is sufficiently large, there exist b˜ such that multinational firms produce less
home-country output than national firms for b < b˜.
Proof: (a) (i) is just a restatement of Assumption 3(d): As b → ∞, ri
becomes so high for both firms that there is no output. (ii) First consider
the multinational firm. Assume it has completely relocated. Fix t > 0,
so that the output of the multinational firm is smaller than if there is no
relocation by Assumption 2(biii) and hence complete relocation involves a
loss in consumer surplus which is independent of b. By continuity of damages
in b and in outputs (Assumption 3(d)), the damage reduction from relocation
approaches 0 as b does. Thus, for every t > 0 there is a critical value of b
below which complete relocation is not optimal.
Moreover, for any given level of a, F and r2, if b is sufficiently small, the
environmental gains from regulation are small by Assumption 3(c). By As-
sumption 2(b) and 3(b), the costs of regulation in terms of reduced consumer
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surplus are positive and independent of t. Hence r1 becomes arbitrarily small
as b does. If t is also sufficiently small, the multinational firm’s gains from re-
duced transportation costs and regulation under partial relocation are small
by continuity of profits in ri and t (Assumption 2(d)), so that partial reloca-
tion is not worthwhile (due to the fixed, positive relocation costs involved).
Thus, there is no relocation.
For the national firm, for sufficiently small b, ri also becomes arbitrar-
ily small. By Assumption 2(f), home-country profits are positive. If t is
also sufficiently small, continuity of profits (Assumption 2(d)) and symmetry
(Assumption 2(c)) imply that it is worthwhile to serve the foreign market as
well. Thus, both firms are serving both markets and face the same regulation
to which they react in the same way.
(b) (i) Fix all parameters except b. By Assumption 3(d), regulation opti-
mally reduces outputs to zero as b → ∞. For b = 0, there is no regulation
and the firm has a positive home country output by Assumption 2(f). By
continuity of optimal regulation in b and continuity of outputs in ri, the in-
termediate value theorem implies that there exists a minimal b ≥ 0 such that
the production of the national firm is optimally reduced to 0. By continuity
of xji the optimal regulation of the multinational firm at b involves complete
relocation with positive imports of country i if t and rj are sufficiently small:
While the advantage from reducing pollution by constraining either firm to
producing for the home country is the same, the multinational firm still gen-
erates a positive consumer surplus whereas the national firm does not.
(ii) Let b be sufficiently small. By continuity of damages in outputs and b,
the benefits from regulation become arbitrarily small. Therefore the optimal
regulation level r1 is small for both the national and the multinational firm.
According to Assumption 2(e), for any r1 there exists a critical value of t such
that there is partial relocation of the multinational above this critical level.
The regulation of the national firm is also close to zero. However, the multi-
national firm produces for both countries. Because outputs are continuous in
regulation levels, the multinational firm produces less than the national firm.
Result a) identifies the conditions under which both firms are regulated
so that they choose the same output levels. In qualitative terms, the regions
where this is the case correspond to those shaded grey in Figure 2. Result b)
uncovers the two forces because of which the multinational firm might pro-
duce less than the national firm: Result (i) reflects the intuition that for low
transportation costs and intermediate values of damages, regulators want to
close down home production of the multinational firm, because supply from
abroad is not costly. Result (ii) reflects the effect that for large transporta-
tion costs and low damages multinational firms will not produce in the home
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country whereas national firms still do.
However, note that we have not included a generalization of the result that,
for large transportation costs and intermediate values of the damage param-
eter, the multinational firm produces more output. While the logic of the
result in Section 6 that multinational firms pollute more than national firms
for some parameter regions is quite general, it merely implies that, if there
are some points in the partial relocation regime where it is optimal to prevent
exports of the national firm, then the multinational firm will be regulated less
for these values and produce larger outputs. While there are large parameter
regions where this logic is confirmed, there are also parameter regions where
this is not the case.
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